Abstract-Recently, a new image scrambling (i.e., encryption) scheme without bandwidth expansion was proposed based on twodimensional discrete prolate spheroidal sequences. A comprehensive cryptanalysis is given here on this image scrambling scheme, showing that it is not sufficiently secure against various cryptographical attacks including ciphertext-only attack, known/chosenplaintext attack, and chosen-ciphertext attack. Detailed cryptanalytic results suggest that the image scrambling scheme can only be used to realize perceptual encryption but not to provide content protection for digital images.
it does not consider the information redundancy existing in the uncompressed images/videos and the syntax structures of the compressed ones. A possible way to overcome these problems is to encrypt part of the given plain-image/video, which is called selective (or partial) encryption. For example, for MPEG videos, only sign bits of the DCT coefficients and the motion vectors can be selected for encryption. Even though partial encryption may not provide a high level of security, it is still useful for realizing perceptual encryption [2] , [10] and format-compliant encryption [11] , which are two interesting security requirements of some multimedia applications.
As a frequently used approach to encrypting images and videos, some schemes were designed by secretly permuting pixels in the plain-image or each frame of the plain-video [12] [13] [14] . This idea can also be generalized to the transform domain, while in this case encryption is achieved by permuting transform coefficients (and/or nodes for some transforms with a tree-like structure) 2 [17] [18] [19] [20] . However, a large number of cryptanalysis reports have shown that these permutation-based image/video encryption schemes are not sufficiently secure from a cryptographical point of view [9] , [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] . The main security problems include: 1) the plain-image/video may be partially recovered due to the large information redundancy existing in natural images/videos (under ciphertext-only attack) and 2) secret permutations are always insecure against known/ chosen-plaintext attack. As a general result of cryptanalysis, secret permutations must be combined with other techniques in order to design a secure image/video encryption scheme.
Another idea in designing image/video encryption schemes is to scramble all the pixels and/or transform coefficients with some multiplicative or additive matrices. This idea can be considered as a generalization of the permutation-only encryption, since secret permutations can be formulated with a permutation matrix as shown in the theoretical models of some permutation-based speech scrambling schemes [15] , [16] . Many optical image encryption methods have been developed in this way, by introducing double random phase matrices (keys) [6] , [28] , [29] , which are used to scramble the plain-image in spatial and frequency (Fourier transform) domains, respectively. However, some recent cryptanalysis work [30] [31] [32] shows that optical image encryption schemes of this kind is not sufficiently secure against known-plaintext attack and chosen-ciphertext attack.
On the other hand, a large number of image encryption schemes were designed by combining different encryption techniques. For example, some image encryption schemes are developed based on the multi-round combination of secret permutations and pixel-value substitutions [33] [34] [35] . There are 2 Although speech encryption is not the focus of this paper, it is worth mentioning that many speech scrambling schemes were also developed based on this idea working in the transform domain [15] , [16] .
1051-8215/$25.00 © 2008 IEEE also a number of attempts of using chaos to design image/video encryption schemes [2] , yet some of which have been cryptanalyzed to be insecure [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] .
This paper focuses on a new image scrambling scheme proposed in [43] , which is a 2-D extension of a speech scrambling scheme proposed earlier in [44] . Compared with other existing image scrambling methods, this scheme does not introduce many high-frequency components into the spectrum of the ciphertext, but causes only a negligible expansion of bandwidth. This feature is useful in some real applications, as the cipherimage can be transmitted with a bandlimited channel that carries the plain-image. The encryption process is mainly achieved by scrambling low-frequency components of a 2-D discrete prolate spheroidal sequences (DPSS) transform by a multiplicative matrix, which serves as the secret key of the scheme. To further enhance the security, random swapping of some high-frequency components and multiple secret matrices were also suggested, each of which corresponds to the encryption of one single block of the plain-image.
In this paper, we report a thorough investigation on the security of the image scrambling scheme proposed in [43] and point out that it is not sufficiently secure against various cryptographical attacks including ciphertext-only attack, known/chosen-plaintext attack, and chosen-ciphertext attack. We also found some other security defects of the scheme when a fixed secret matrix is used to encrypt all blocks of the plain-image. Based on the cryptanalytic results, we conclude that the image scrambling scheme should only be used to realize perceptual encryption, i.e., for degrading the visual quality of the plain-images in a secret manner.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, a description of the image scrambling scheme is given in the next section. Then, Section III focuses on the cryptanalytic findings, with both theoretical and experimental results demonstrated. In Section IV, the question of how to use the image scrambling scheme in practice is addressed. Finally, the last section concludes the paper.
II. IMAGE SCRAMBLING SCHEME WITHOUT BANDWIDTH EXPANSION
The image scrambling scheme proposed in [43] is a 2-D extension of Wyner's signal scrambling scheme [44] based on DPSSs, which are defined as the normalized eigenvectors of the following real and symmetric matrix:
Denote the DPSS, i.e., the eigenvectors of , by , where , and the corresponding eigenvalues by . It was showed [45] that form an orthonormal basis that spans the subspace of sequences with an energy concentration in a certain band . Thus, for any sequence , one can use the DPSS to get another sequence such that (or ), where . Based on such a DPSS transformation, one can scramble and then perform an inverse transform as an alternative way of encrypting the original sequence . The encryption process can be described as , where is the secret matrix that scrambles . For such a scrambling scheme, Wyner [44] showed that the bandwidth expansion will be negligible if the smallest eigenvalue corresponding to scrambled coefficients in is sufficiently large. More precisely, assuming that all coefficients in are ranked by the eigenvalues in descending order and only the lowest coefficients 3 are scrambled, Wyner deduced that the energy concentration of the scrambled sequence differs at most by as compared to the concentration of the original sequence . In this case, the secret matrix is of the following form:
where is the submatrix scrambling the lowest coefficients and is the identity matrix. One can see that this scrambling scheme is a selective encryption algorithm, since some coefficients in are left unchanged.
In [43] , the 1-D DPSS was extended to the case of 2-D square passband region as follows: (3) where and . Accordingly, the eigenvalues corresponding to are . Then, by scanning all elements in each to form an vector and sorting these eigenvectors such that , one gets an matrix . Now, given an secret matrix and an vector , the 2-D scrambling scheme has the same encryption formula as the 1-D one (4) Each block of a digital image is scanned row by row (or column by column) to form an vector, which is then encrypted by using the above equation. After the encryption is done, all elements in the vector are placed back into the image block in the same scanning order. Besides scrambling lowest coefficients in , another encryption operation was also suggested in [43] : swapping these coefficients that correspond to the same eigenvalues. This swapping operation is dependent on the fact that and is unavailable in the 1-D case. In [43] , it was not explicitly mentioned how to perform the swapping operation on valid coefficients. However, if all pairs of coefficients with the same eigenvalue are swapped, then the adversary can swap all of them again to totally cancel this encryption operation. So, in this paper, we assume that a secret pseudorandom keystream is used to randomly select some (averagely half of all) pairs of coefficients for swapping.
When the scrambling scheme is exerted on digital images with gray scales, the input and output have to be calibrated to make the scrambling more efficient. Assuming that one plain-block in the plain-image is and the corresponding cipher-block is (both are vectors), the encryption process becomes
where converts the input real number into the nearest integer in an vector in which each element is , and (6) Accordingly, assuming the recovered image is , the decryption process is carried out as follows: (7) Due to the round-off errors existing in the encryption/decryption processes, it is obvious that the original plain-image cannot be exactly recovered in most cases. Another problem is that the use of may enlarge the noise added to . In [43, Sec. V], experimental results were given to show that may not be determined by (6) , and an "optimal" value was found for a set of test images:
, in the sense of mean absolute error (MAE) and mean squared error (MSE) in the recovering of the plain-image. 4 As to the choice of the secret submatrix that scrambles the lowest coefficients in , it was suggested in [43] to derive it from a Hadamard matrix , which is a (-1,1)-matrix 5 and its rows and columns are orthogonal [46] . Its inverse matrix is . By permuting the rows/columns of and/or multiplying some rows/columns by , one can get an -equivalent matrix. In this way, one can get -equivalent matrices, where some of them are identical. Each -equivalent matrix can be scaled to get a secret submatrix, . Generally, the plain-image is much larger than , so there are many blocks for encryption. To further enhance the security of the image scrambling scheme, in [43] it was also suggested that one may change the secret matrix for each block, under the control of a cryptographical pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). In this case, the key of the scrambling scheme becomes the seed of the PRNG. To facilitate the following cryptanalysis, we use to denote this encryption configuration and to denote the basic configuration with a fixed secret matrix.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS
As a major part of modern cryptology, cryptanalysis focuses on the security analysis of different kinds of cryptographical algorithms, including encryption schemes (ciphers), hash functions, and security protocols [7] . Generally, the following four types of attacks should be considered when evaluating the security of a cipher:
• ciphertext-only attack, in which an attacker can only observe a number of ciphertexts; • known-plaintext attack, in which an attacker can observe a number of plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts; 4 In this paper, we mainly use PSNR to investigate the performance, because PSNR is more popular in the area of image processing than MAE and MSE. To keep a direct comparison with the results in [43] , the MAE value is also given for all images measured in this paper with PSNR. 5 The order of a Hadamard matrix (i.e., the value of v) cannot be an arbitrary value, but can only be 1, 2, or 4n, where n 2 . So, this key-generated method can be used only when v satisfies this requirement.
• chosen-plaintext attack, in which an attacker can deliberately choose a number of plaintexts and observe the corresponding ciphertexts; • chosen-ciphertext attack, in which an attacker can deliberately choose a number of ciphertexts and observe the corresponding plaintexts. Among the four attacks, ciphertext-only attack is the simplest one, and every cipher should resist this kind of attack. The other three attacks are much more advanced, but have become more and more popular in today's digital and networked world. Known-plaintext attack is very common on modern ciphers, since most binary files and data packets transmitted over networks have some fixed segments, such as the leading headers and frequently used syntax elements. Chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks are possible when an attacker gets a temporary access to the encryption/decryption machine or can seduce the target user to store some chosen files or transmit some chosen data. An imaginary scenario of chosen-plaintext attack is as follows: 1) Eve sends an interesting photo to Alice; 2) Alice encrypts the photo with her secret key and then forwards it to Bob for sharing; and 3) Eve mounts a chosen-plaintext attack after observing the encrypted photo transmitted over the public channel.
If a cipher can resist only ciphertext-only attack, it has to be used very carefully to avoid any possibility of the other three types of attacks. Here, we report a results of a comprehensive investigation on the security of the image scrambling scheme under study against all four kinds of attacks. Throughout this section, without loss of generality, we employ the scrambling parameters used in [43, Sec. V] for demonstration:
. The secret matrix and the random swapping operations are both controlled by the function with a random seed. All of the experiments were carried out with Mathwork's Matlab 6.5, based on a series of programs derived from the reference codes 6 used in [43] .
A. Ciphertext-Only Attack
The visible encryption performance of the image scrambling scheme is explained first. For a 256 256 plain-image with 256 gray scales (i.e., ) shown in Fig. 1 , the encryption results when and are given in Fig. 2 (a) and (b), respectively. It can be seen that some smooth areas in the plainimage are still recognizable after encryption. This problem was also noticed by the authors of [43] and considered as a minor security problem that can be further improved with some other techniques.
In the following, consider how to get more visual information from the cipher-images than that in Fig. 2 . There are several different ways to do so.
1) Error-Concealment Based Attack [11] : Since the image scrambling scheme is a selective encryption algorithm, we can try to recover the plain-image from these unencrypted coefficients. This error-concealment-based attack (ECA) is a common attack on all selective encryption methods. As pointed out in [2] and [47] , for selective encryption based on any orthogonal transform, there is always some visual information leaking from the unencrypted transform coefficients. Although the corresponding energy of these unencrypted coefficients may be rather small, some important visual information can still be distinguished by human eyes. It is true that 2-D DPSS also forms an orthogonal transform, so an attacker can try to carry out an ECA on the image scrambling scheme by setting the scrambled low coefficients to be some fixed values. use them to statistically optimize the breaking performance of ECA. For 1200 natural images falling into four different categories of "people," "wild animals," "textures," and "city life and China," we calculated the mean values and variances of as shown in Fig. 7 . One can see that the mean values of these ratios are really stable for the 1200 test images (though the variances are not very small for some):
. The above fact implies that the following setting of the eight lowest coefficients is optimal to achieve the best breaking performance of ECA in a statistical sense:
. For the two cipherimages shown in Fig. 2 , the performance of such an optimized ECA is shown in Fig. 8 . Considering the variances of shown in Fig. 7(b) , in a real attack one can further adjust the values of and to get an even better breaking performance. For example, by introducing a small degree of randomness in the values of -, we have obtained some results with clearer edges To further demonstrate the performance of this attack, the results of the optimized ECA for other two plain-images, "cameraman" and "house," are given in Fig. 11 .
2) Breaking Random Swapping: When , the random swapping coefficients may be exhaustively guessed and then verified by observing the breaking performance of the optimized ECA. When , there are pairs of coefficients with equal eigenvalues in , so the complexity of guessing all random coefficients operations is not greater than . Since the 2-D DPSS coefficients play a minor role in representing the visual information of an image, one can only guess the random swapping coefficients in , in which there are only valid pairs of coefficients for possible swapping. In this case, the guessing complexity is reduced to be and becomes feasible for an attacker to carry out in practice. Because the attacker does not know the original image, he/she has to check each obtained image with naked eyes, trying to find a satisfactory result. Assuming that he/she can examine one image within one minute, a complexity of means that two days should be enough to finish the work. In the case that a group of people are working together, the attack will be even easier. Fig. 12 shows the broken result when all random swapping operations ofare removed. Comparing Figs. 12 and 8(a) , one can see that the former contains more recognizable details. To fix this security defect, one can either enlarge the block size or always set . The latter is better since it works for any block size.
3) Insecurity of Hadamard-Based Matrices: When the secret submatrix is generated from a Hadamard matrix as suggested in [43] , our experiments showed that the decryption is not sufficiently sensitive to the key mismatch, which is an undesirable property for a good cryptosystem and generally leads to a dramatic reduction of the key space [7] . In our experiments, we exerted some fundamental matrix transformations on the original sub-matrix so as to get some mismatched matrices, which are then used as a replacement of the original secret matrix for decrypting the cipher-image in Fig. 2(a) . Some selected results are given in Fig. 13 , from which one can see that many severely mismatched keys can still recover the plain-image with acceptable qualities.
The low sensitivity of decryption to key mismatch means that a randomly generated key may be capable of roughly recovering the plain-image. Fig. 14 gives the best recovery result of one experiment, in which 100 randomly generated keys were used to decrypt the cipher-image of Fig. 2(a) . By testing 100 000 random keys, an estimated probability density function (pdf) of PSNR were obtained as shown in Fig. 15 . From this empirical pdf, we can calculate and obtain the probability of dB to be about 0.017. Thus, it is a high-probability event to get a similar result like Fig. 14 by guessing only random keys, making the random-guess attack feasible in practice. In some sense, we can say that the size of the Hadamard-based key space is dramatically reduced to be smaller than 100.
Note that this security flaw is not so severe when . In this case, each block is encrypted by a different secret matrix. If the number of blocks in a plain-image is sufficiently large, it will be impossible to randomly guess all possible secret matrices to reveal the whole image. Of course, it remains practical for an attacker to guess several selected blocks and roughly recover a small area of the plain-image.
4) Low Sensitivity to Plaintext:
The encryption scheme under study has another undesirable property: it is not sufficiently sensitive to plaintext. This feature is a natural result of the low sensitivity of the involved matrix computation to input plaintext. Assume that the additive error in is bounded by . Then, the augmented error in is bounded by , since each element of is not greater than 1. This means that the encryption scheme under study is not suitable to be used for encrypting a number of similar plain-images (such as an image and its watermarked counterpart) with the same key; otherwise, the exposure of one plain-image leads to a rough revealment of all the plain-images.
B. Known-Plaintext Attack
In known-plaintext attack, one can get a number of plainimages and the corresponding cipher-images. According to (5), the encryption matrix can be derived as follows when known plain-blocks form an invertible matrix : (8) where is the cipher-matrix corresponding to , and denotes the error matrix induced by the function. By ignoring the error matrix can be estimated by the following equation: and the estimation error is (10) Then, can be used as a replacement of for decryption. It is not easy to theoretically analyze the relationship between and (i.e., the relationship between and the decryption performance of ), so we carried out a large number of experiments to investigate the real decryption performance of by choosing some sets of plain-blocks to form . In the following, we report our experimental results for two different cases according to the two values of .
1)
: In this case, all blocks of a plain-image are encrypted with the same matrix , so generally one known plain-image is enough for an attacker to choose many sets of plain-blocks, some of which may correspond to a good estimation of (i.e., to an acceptable recovery performance of any given plain-image). Fig. 2(a) , estimated from 100 000 random keys.
When the known plain-image is "Lena" (Fig. 1) , the best results of decrypting the cipher-image of "Lena" [ Fig. 2(a) ] in two separate attacks are given in Fig. 16 , with 1000 and 10 000 sets of blocks, 7 respectively. One can see that the decryption performance is good enough to reveal almost all visual information in the plain-image. 7 To ensure the invertibility of the formed matrix J J J 0L=2 and to increase the attacking efficiency, in our experiments we first ranked all valid blocks by their variances and then randomly chose N N blocks from the 100 ones with larger variances for attacking. A similar but slightly different measure was also used for the experiments given in Section III-B2 when change key = 1. Further experiments showed that some known plain-images can even yield a much better performance than "Lena." When the known plain-image "Lena" is replaced by the two images shown in Fig. 17 , respectively, the decryption results of the cipher-image in Fig. 2(a) are given in Fig. 18 . It can be seen that the decryption performance is nearly perfect. Although it is hard to give a theoretical explanation, this phenomenon can be intuitively explained: "Lena" contains less blocks with large variances than the other two images.
2) : In this case, each block of a plain-image corresponds to a distinctive encryption matrix , so one plain-image is not capable of supporting the known-plaintext attack. Instead, plain-images should be known such that, for each block, plain-blocks (one in each plain-image) can be chosen to estimate each . When , for the four different categories of natural images used in the last subsection, "wild animals," "people," "textures," and "city life and China," we tested the decryption performances of the known-plaintext attack with 500 valid sets of plain-blocks for each (note that there are possible sets, but some may not be valid). The decryption results are shown in Fig. 19 . The different performances of different sets can be qualitatively explained as follows: for a given block-position , the breaking performance will be better, if the corresponding blocks of all known plain-images are less correlated. For example, for the category "people," most plain-images have a relatively smooth background, so blocks from different plain-images may be closely correlated or even be almost identical. This will significantly reduce the breaking performance. On the other hand, for the category "textures," generally there does not exist a smooth background, so blocks from different plain-images are relatively less correlated.
By choosing more valid sets of plain-blocks for each encryption matrix or employing some noise-filtering methods, the performance can be further improved.
C. Chosen-Plaintext Attack
Compared with known-plaintext attack, in chosen-plaintext attack, one can freely choose some plain-blocks to optimize the breaking performance. Now let us choose , where denotes the identity matrix. Then, (10) can be simplified as follows: (11) which immediately leads to and proves the proposition. 8 Then, from Proposition 1, one can get (12) which means that the best breaking performance is reached when is maximized, i.e., when . With this chosen value of , some experiments have been made to confirm this theoretical result, as shown in Fig. 20 . Note that this attack needs only plain-blocks when and plain-images when .
D. Chosen-Ciphertext Attack
In this attack, one can choose cipher-images instead of plainimages, so the target for reconstruction changes from to its transpose matrix . When cipher-blocks form an invertible matrix , one can get the following equation from (7) But the weak result is already sufficient to support the following analysis on the choice of jsj.
Removing the quantization error , one has (14)
Similarly, choosing , one further gets (16) On the range of each element in , we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2: if and only if (17) Proof: From (7), one has
Note that if and only if , which is equivalent to . Solving the two inequalities proves the proposition.
From the above proposition, when , one has (18) When or , it is not easy to directly estimate the range of , but it is expected to be greater than . For a randomly generated key, Fig. 21 gives the experimental relationship between the value of and the breaking performance of the chosen-ciphertext attack, from which one can see that the best decryption performance is achieved when (see Fig. 22 for the decryption results when ). Due to the symmetry of the curve shown in Fig. 21 , in a real attack one can try all positive (or negative) values of to determine an optimal value as the outcome of the cryptanalysis. This means that the attack needs no more than cipher-blocks when and cipher-images when . Note that in most cases it is actually sufficient to achieve a nearly optimal result by fixing the value of around 50. In this case, cipher-blocks/images are enough to support this attack.
IV. DISCUSSION
Recalling the cryptanalysis given in the last section, one can see that one essential reason for all of the attacks to be successful is the low sensitivity of the decryption to key mismatch. Actually, this feature is not unique for the original 2-D DPSS basis set shown in [43, Fig. 1 ]. We also tested some other basis sets and similar results have been obtained (but with some differences in the details, such as the histograms of -shown in Fig. 4 ). This implies that the low sensitivity to key mismatch is a common feature of most (if not all) orthogonal transforms. 9 This can be explained by the low sensitivity of matrix computation to small quantization errors and the marvelous capability of the human eye to resist noises in natural images.
In Tables I and II, we give a summary of all of the cryptanalytic results obtained through the last section. It is clear that the image scrambling scheme under study is not secure against all four types of attacks, although it does not suffer from two security flaws, i.e., random swapping breaking and insecurity of Hadamard-based key, when . From the experimental results given in the last section, the breaking performance of the four attacks can be ranked as follows (from the best to the worst): chosen-ciphertext attack chosen-plaintext attack known-plaintext attack ciphertextonly attack (ECA). For the worst attack, the ECA, only a lowresolution view of the plain-image can be successfully recov- 9 As an interesting comparison, there is another similar (but with different reason) phenomenon [2] , [47] : selective encryption working with any orthogonal transform cannot conceal all visual information of the plain-image. ered, and most high-resolution details are lost (see Fig. 8 ). As a result, we have the following recommendations on how to apply this particular image scrambling scheme in real applications.
• Use it ONLY for the purpose of perceptual encryption.
• NEVER use the same key to encrypt more than one plainimage 10 or NEVER repeatedly use the same key for more than one plain-image if known/chosen-plaintext or chosenciphertext attack is likely.
• ALWAYS set if the secret matrix is generated from a Hadamard matrix. Perceptual encryption is a technique of multimedia encryption that is used to degrade the perceptible quality of multimedia data, under the control of a secret key and a quality-degradation factor [2] , [10] . Here, the secret key is used to avoid any illegal attempt of reconstructing the multimedia data in a higher quality, and the quality-degradation factor determines the degradation degree induced by the perceptual encryption. Apparently, for the image scrambling scheme under study, the degradation on the visual quality of the plain-image should not be measured by the cipher-image, but by the recovered plain-image via the optimized ECA discussed in Section III-A1.
Despite the above security problems and limitations, this particular image scrambling scheme has some advantages in realizing a lossy perceptual encryption scheme, i.e., an encryp- tion scheme that works well with any lossy compression algorithm. This is mainly because this scrambling scheme does not incur significant bandwidth expansion, which is generally not the case for many other image encryption schemes. Our experiments have shown that the encryption has only negligible influence on the compression efficiency of a standard JPEG algorithm, as expected from the bandwidth preservation feature. Another important factor is that the decryption is not very sensitive to errors in cipher-images, due to the same reason that the encryption is not very sensitive to plaintext as discussed in Section III-A4. Fig. 23 gives the decryption results when the cipher-image in Fig. 2(b) is compressed by the standard JPEG algorithm with the parameter "Quality" equal to 40-90, respectively. One can see that the lossy compression really leads to a lossy decryption result, but the recovery performance remains acceptable as long as the compression ratio is not very high.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a comprehensive investigation on the security of an image scrambling scheme recently proposed in [43] .
As a result, it has been found that this image scrambling scheme is not sufficiently secure against various types of attacks: ciphertext-only attack, known-plaintext attack, chosen-plaintext attack, or chosen-ciphertext attack. Two other major security flaws have also been pointed out when a fixed secret matrix is used to encrypt the whole image. Based on the cryptanalytic results, it is concluded that this image scrambling scheme can only be used for (lossless or lossy) perceptual encryption, instead of providing a full protection of all (or most) visual information in the plain-image.
